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MONDAY, MARCH 26, 1928

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ARISTOTLE'S 'LOST CHAPTER ON COMEDY'

(Concluded from page 148)

III

The Sources of the Appropriate Emotions.—Aristotle, in the fourteenth chapter of the *Poetics* (53 b 11), opens his examination of the sources of pity and fear with this introductory sentence: 'Let us consider, then, what kinds of occurrence strike us as terrible, or rather, what kinds of terrible occurrences strike us as piteous'. Professor Cooper's "Amplified Version" of Aristotle's development of this theme occupies four full pages. In his "Adaptation" to comedy he makes no effort to remodel this most important material. He drops it out entirely. In its place he refers the reader to certain material in the *Tractate* (225, 229-259). To prepare our minds for this he converts the carefully specific introductory sentence, which I have just quoted, to read for his adaptation as follows (202): "...Let us consider, then, what kinds of occurrence strike us as ludicrous. ..." Note that he finds the companion idea of 'pleasure' introduced by the *Tractate* unsuited when he wishes to use a different portion of the same document. Further, he warns us (202) that, according to this portion of the *Tractate*, "...comic effect would seem to arise in possibly equal measure from the occurrences represented, and from the diction". He is obliged to introduce this warning because diction is not treated in the *Poetics* at this point, but is reserved for a separate and later chapter. Obviously, this section of the *Tractate* is no easier to adjust to Professor Cooper's "Adapted Version" than are the other parts we have investigated.

The material in question is a diagram of sixteen categories of sources of comic effect. Seven are grouped under "diction" (229-239): (1) Homonyms; (2) Synonyms; (3) Garrulity; (4) Paronyms; (5) Diminutives; (6) Perversion; and (7) Grammar and Syntax. The other nine are called "things" (239-259): (1) Assimilation, employed (a) toward the worse, (b) toward the better; (2) Deception; (3) The Impossible; (4) The Possible and Inconsequent; (5) The Unexpected; (6) Debasing the Personages; (7) Clownish Dancing; (8) When one of those having power, neglecting the greatest things, takes the most worthless; and (9) When the story is disjointed, and has no sequence.

Upon the merits of this catalogue Mr. Starkie comments as follows¹⁰:

... Though thorough and conscientious, it suffers from the original sin of all literary classification in intruding science upon art, and so is somewhat mechanical and external.... As a commentator whom Molière

would probably call a pedant, I have found it useful, but I admit its faults, as I do my own. Like all such classifications it does little justice to the combination in Aristophanes and Shakespeare of wit, gaiety, swiftness of apprehension, lightness of touch, obscenity, frivolity, and above all, the power to touch pitch without being defiled.

A list may have these faults, however, and be, for these very reasons, the more authentic. If we point out that it is inadequate, uneven, in parts incomprehensible, in other parts redundant, the more arguments shall we pile up for some critics that it savors of Aristotle.

The important fact in the minds of its defenders is, as Mr. Starkie observes, that it is a useful, more or less workable, classification—and we have no other. I shall not enter upon the quicksands of controversy which underlie any examination into the appropriateness, consistency, and completeness of a classification of jokes. We have another, and less subjective, avenue of approach which seems to offer securer ground for argument: Aristotle's two allusions in the *Rhetoric* to a treatment of this sort in the *Poetics*. In the first (1. 11) he calls it a 'separate treatment' of the forms of the ludicrous; in the second (3. 18) he declares that '...the various kinds of laughter have been analyzed in the *Poetics*'. Fortunately, both allusions are accompanied by further statements which indicate something of the character of this missing material, and the difference between what they envisage and what the *Tractate*'s list supplies constitutes a serious discrepancy.

In the former passage the nature of this separate treatment is suggested as follows: 'The causes of laughter must be pleasant—namely, persons, utterances, and deeds'. If this refers to material arranged as a catalogue, it refers to one with three headings, 'persons', 'utterances', and 'deeds', instead of to one, like that of the *Tractate*, with only two headings, 'diction' and 'things'; and even in the corresponding two the nomenclature is sufficiently different to permit of differing limitations: λόγοι vs. λέξεις, ἔργα vs. πράγματα. I prefer to see in this allusion a reference to the whole treatment of comedy under the same headings as we find in the *Poetics* for tragedy—Plot, Character, and Diction. It would be independent evidence that Professor Cooper's method of adaptation is sound in general.

Similarly, Aristotle's second reference in the *Rhetoric* (3. 18) contains its own evidence that something different from the *Tractate*'s list is in Aristotle's mind. After stating that 'the various kinds of laughter have been analyzed in the *Poetics*', he adds descriptively, 'Some of these kinds of laughter befit a free man; others do not. Irony is more refined than buffoonery'.

¹⁰An Aristotelian Analysis of the Comic (*Hermathena*, No. 42 [1920], 48). See note 8, above.

Clearly, Aristotle is naming two of the kinds of laughter which were to be found analyzed in the Poetics, but neither of them appears in the Tractate's list of sources of comic effect. They do appear elsewhere in the Tractate as types of character, and, to my mind, this demonstrates that Aristotle was not referring to a list like the Tractate's, but to a study of the comic hero, a study comparable to that of the tragic hero, which Professor Cooper should have brought into his adaptation of Chapter 15. In other words, this reference looks to Aristotle's treatment of character in the lost sections on comedy, in harmony with his plan in the Poetics, and not to a novelty like the Tractate's list of categories.

These two references in the Rhetoric, therefore, seem to me to be antagonistic to the Tractate. Another consideration is equally destructive: the Tractate's list does not fit into Professor Cooper's adaptation of Chapter 14 of the Poetics—and yet this is the only place for it. It is plainly out of harmony with Aristotle's plan of treatment.

Aristotle's argument prior to Chapter 14 has been developing as follows.

The object of the tragic plot is to inspire in the spectator the emotions of pity and fear. These emotions are more effectively stirred by a plot which is framed about Discovery and Reversal of Fortune than by one in which these elements are lacking (Chapters 6, 11). The most truly tragic type of Reversal is the single type, from happiness into misery, which makes us pity the hero because his prospects in life and his general character make him deserving of a better fate, and which makes us fear for ourselves because the frailty which has caused this Reversal of Fortune is comparatively so insignificant and one with which we all sympathize. Less truly tragic is the double Reversal which befalls two characters, one admirable, the other detestable, when the dramatist first arouses our pity and fear for the hero through his overthrow at the hands of the villain, but then introduces the comic element in another Reversal which overthrows the villain and exalts the deserving hero.

It is at this juncture that Aristotle turns from the structure of the plot to the content of the story. The question he puts himself is (53 b 14), Ποῖα οὖν δεῖν ἢ ποῖα αἰετὰ φαινεῖται τῶν συμπεπλεγμένων, i. e. What occurrences in a drama frighten us, or, better, fill us with pity? As the following discussion indicates, Aristotle has no intention of analyzing the many sources of terror; the general problem of fear is beside the point. He wants to determine merely what kind of dramatic material most effectively carries out the function of tragedy by making the spectator most pity the suffering of the actors in the drama. Even then, his answer is not a catalogue of types of crimes that arouse our pity, but a statement of underlying principles. Only an act, he says, which violates the natural ties of affection arouses the dramatically perfect pity in the spectator. The same crimes committed by enemies or by persons who are indifferent to one another stir in us only an undramatic sort of pity. Therefore, the first rule to observe in choosing

a tragic story is to find one which concerns those who are, or should be, united by the closest bonds of blood or affection. Even such stories, he continues, as he probes more deeply, do not all yield the same degree of pity. They, too, are subject to the general dramatic law of Discovery and Reversal. Wherefore, the causing of suffering to one whom you never discover to be your kinsman is much less pitiful than the same act when discovery of the tie follows. More dramatically effective still is the intent to commit such a crime (the mere intent causing suffering), frustrated by the discovery of the tie, with its resultant reversal of situation. Mere intent, however, unattended by ignorance of the tie, and not carried into execution, is the least pitiful of the possible situations.

Thus, Discovery and Reversal dominate Aristotle's analysis. It is all a matter of plot. Outside of this he asserts but one principle, that the suffering which arouses pity is that which kinsmen cause one another. 'I have now said enough', he concludes, 'about the structure of the plot and the stories on which plots should be based'.

In place of this discussion of the emotional background to the tragic incidents, Professor Cooper would substitute in his adaptation a list which neither is restricted to the single consideration of what enhances the dramatic effect of the 'ludicrous' nor yet includes this subject in a larger treatment based on all six constitutive elements of comedy. The Tractate's catalogue contains the heading "Diction", but no headings for Plot, Ethos, Dianoia, Music, or Spectacle. Separately, the Tractate speaks of Ethos, Dianoia, Music, and Spectacle, but without explaining how they may be made ludicrous. The second part of the catalogue must include the sources of the ludicrous in all these other five divisions of a comedy. Therefore, it is not the special discussion of plot which fits into our Aristotelian discussion at this point. Nor has it the earmarks of such a discussion: it does not mention Discovery or Reversal; and it refers to no comic emotions corresponding to pity and fear. As a result, in order to introduce it, Professor Cooper has omitted, instead of adapting, the discussion in the Poetics. Except for the Tractate, I believe, he would have remodelled this important passage. In the three following paragraphs I attempt to show how this might be done.

We know that the ideal hero of a comedy must be one who, instead of being ennobled by his general elevation of character and his position in life, has his follies exaggerated by the low character attributed to him and by the debasing of his position in life. Instead of kings and princes we must have imposters, cowards, misers. Follies and vices acting upon such material will not make us laugh if characters begin in misery and end in happiness. We shall laugh if the comic characters fall from happiness into discomfort. We shall laugh if their follies bring deserved, but not too painful, punishment; and this Reversal will be the more laughable the more unexpected it is. Therefore, the hero's end may be pleasant to us, unpleasant for him. But there may be also the double plot, involving, besides the more ludicrous character, one more nearly

like ourselves, yet still of an inferior type, who embodies our own hopes and fears. We shall want him to succeed where the other fails, and, therefore, the Reversal in his case must be from discomfort to joy, as indicated in the *Poetics* (53 a 37).

Here, at last, we come to the question of 'the comic incidents' and ask ourselves not what specific acts, but what kind of acts in a drama, as distinct from the above recommended structure of the plot, not only make us laugh, but have some special dramatic value. Marriages, feasts, victories in contests, etc., make us happy, and make us laugh for glee with the actors who enjoy them, but the peculiar function of comedy is to make us laugh at follies and vices. What is the ridiculous situation of characters in comedy which corresponds to the blood-tie in tragedy? It should be such as to intensify of itself the ludicrousness of the comic hero's fall, and should, in its most ridiculous form of all, be associated with Discovery. We may paraphrase the *Poetics* and say that one can make ridiculous his friend or his foe, or some person to whom he is indifferent. Of these, assuredly, it is the person or the idea which arouses our anger or envy that all comic practice indicates to be the proper butt for ridicule. Consequently, natural antagonism is the ideal situation for the development of the ridiculous: pacifist vs. bellicose (*Acharnians*), miser vs. spendthrift (*Clouds*), impostor vs. the gullible (*Tartuffe*), age vs. youth (*New Comedy*), conservatism vs. radicalism (*Frogs*), etc.

Professor Cooper drew from his collected sources the connection of anger and envy with comedy, but he made no use of this in his adaptation. My argument above brings me to these sentiments. Both in the spectators and in the actors of the drama the situations which will give relish to the comedy are those which demolish the superiority of those we envy and establish in ourselves a sense of superiority over those with whom we are angry. Pursuing the analogy further, we may say that the more ignorant of his true position of inferiority we can keep a ludicrous character, the more we enjoy his ludicrousness; and, finally, if we can make his discovery of his inferiority coincident with the greatest evidence of his folly, we shall have the most effective sort of ridicule.

Some such paragraphs as the three preceding paragraphs seem to me to be nearer the Aristotelian method of analysis than the Tractate's sixteen rhetorical categories.

IV

The Comic Emotions.—Our argument has reached the point where we should try to formulate more exactly the emotional end of comedy. Obviously, we have just been stating that theory of comedy which is known as the Derision Theory. It is not an explanation of every kind of laughter; it is here restricted to the laughter aroused by comic drama. Neither 'Derision' nor 'Ridicule' is an accurate description of the emotion. The emotion is a composite of two kinds of satisfaction, one malicious, the other innocent. Anger and envy enter into the situation as the background of the most comic situations. They supply the ad-

mixture of harmless pain that Aristotle finds an ingredient of comic laughter. They are not the substitutes for tragic pity and fear. If Aristotle ever replaced *ἔλεος* and *φόβος* of his tragic definition by two other words in his comic definition, our argument calls for two words that will describe the two kinds of satisfaction I have mentioned.

I have argued above that 'pleasure' and 'laughter' can not be the end of comedy. I have shown that the Greek words, *ἡδονή* and *γέλωις*, can not be substituted everywhere for *ἔλεος* and *φόβος*. Yet, when I try to fix upon two Greek words to reproduce the two kinds of satisfaction which I wish to express, I am led inevitably back to *ἡδονή* and *γέλωις*, the former to express innocent mirth or delight, the latter to express malicious fun, or ridicule. For *ἡδονή* is used of specific pleasure as well as of general, and *γέλωις* is the Greek word for the source of laughter as well as for the laughter itself. My earlier argument is, I believe, valid for Professor Cooper's translation of these words. I think that his "pleasure" and "laughter" must be changed. But in the sense of Derision as qualified above I know of no two words which Aristotle would more probably have used. Properly interpreted, therefore, the definition of the catharsis of comedy as preserved in the Tractate appears to me to be genuinely Aristotelian: *δι' ἡδονῆς καὶ γέλωτος περαινουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν*. To this extent we are indebted to the Tractate. I shall not attempt any translation beyond the interpretation I have given above. I shall leave that to the philosophers. It is summarized for me in an expression used by Ludwig Lewisohn in his *Drama and the Stage*: "...the release of the pleasurable emotion of superiority".

V

Minor Matters.—Acceptance of the Tractate's statement of the comic catharsis does not compel acceptance of the list of the sources of comic emotion any more than of the statement that "Comedy is the imitation of an action that is imperfect", or of the other statements in the definition of comedy which have to be changed. There are also other portions of the Tractate which appear to have nothing to do with Aristotle.

Professor Cooper himself points out the incompleteness of the Tractate's list of comic types, which takes cognizance only of buffoons, ironical men, and impostors. Aristotle may have argued that these three types make the most effective comic characters because they lend themselves best to Discovery and Reversal. But they hardly exhaust the possibilities. In Professor Cooper's words (177),

...It is often possible to reduce to one of these last three types a character whose comic flaw at first sight might seem to be one of the other vices.... In other cases... the flaw in character which gives rise to the comic effect is clearly not one of these three, but as in *L'Avare*, avarice, or, as in *Le Malade Imaginaire*, cowardice or some other vice.

It is one of Professor Cooper's main contentions that Aristophanes was to Aristotle the chief representative of comedy. Therefore, he can not accept for his adaptation the Tractate's nomenclature for the various

technical divisions of comedy. The Tractate merely repeats what the Poetics gives as the "four quantitative parts . . . prologue, choricon, episode, and exode . . ." If Aristotle, says Professor Cooper (55), "tried to generalise from the practice of authors all the way from Epicharmus to Anaxandrides, he might have called a portion of comedy intervening between two portions more distinctly musical an episode". But, in point of fact, this four-fold analysis seems to him inadequate for Aristophanes and he substitutes in his adaptation a summary of Zielinski's analysis¹, adding a note from J. W. White.

Another of the offerings of the Tractate which fills Professor Cooper with admiration is its list of categories under *Dianoia*. He can, and does, prove that they are in complete harmony with Aristotelian rhetorical tradition. But he fails to observe that they have no peculiar application to comedy. They are equally, if not more, appropriate to the discussion of the *Dianoia* of tragedy. In our extant Poetics we possess this discussion; and it disposes of these categories by referring the reader to the author's work on Rhetoric. Had Aristotle included them in his chapter on comedy, he would have referred to this later portion. Apparently, he considered the Rhetoric the proper place for details of this nature and thought of his Poetics as an outline of major topics. His treatment of *Dianoia*, for example, consists of a brief definition of its sphere and dramatic functions (Chapter 19). If my idea of his chapter on comedy is at all correct, he was even more summary there, and must have referred back to his treatment of this subject for tragedy. Professor Cooper himself in his adaptation of Chapter 19 (209-210) significantly finds no suitable opportunity for introducing the Tractate's categories. They belong rather to some technical work on Rhetoric, perhaps the same from which the Tractate's list of sources of comic emotion was garbled.

It is equally unlikely that in his treatment of comedy in the Poetics Aristotle already had sufficient perspective to establish the division of comedy into Old, Middle, and New. Dates are stubbornly against this possibility. The Tractate in presenting this division seems definitely again to be borrowing from some post-Aristotelian author.

From some other source than the Poetics the author of the Tractate must also borrow the wholly un-Aristotelian statement that 'Tragedy aims at having a due proportion of fear'. This saves us from ascribing to the lost chapters on comedy the Tractate's collateral statement that 'Comedy aims at having a due proportion of laughter'.

Finally, in direct contradiction to the corner-stone of the Poetics, the initial step of the Tractate's author is to divide the field of poetry into two types, mimetic and non-mimetic, including under the latter such didactic poetry as Aristotle expressly refuses to call poetry.

In conclusion, therefore, it would seem that the Tractate Coislinianus must be used with extreme caution in any attempt to restore Aristotle's lost

chapters on comedy. While there is evident much imitation of the Poetics, in those places where we have the language of the Poetics to compare with the Tractate the Tractate differs essentially from the Poetics. The Tractate certainly borrows from other sources which it may quote as badly as it does the Poetics. These other sources would seem to have approached the subject from a somewhat different point of view from that adopted in the Poetics for tragedy and, presumably, followed for comedy. At least, if Professor Cooper is following a legitimate method, as I believe he is, in rebuilding the lost chapter within the framework of the present Poetics, there is no place, in my opinion, for most of the Tractate's novelties.

The one contribution from the Tractate, which may prove to be of extreme value, is the pair of words, *γλωτ* and *ῥδονή*, named as psychological objectives of comedy. Their translation, as I have suggested, is fraught with difficulty and has not been successfully handled by Professor Cooper.

My proposal, therefore, for the reconstruction of Aristotle's 'lost chapter on comedy' would be to ignore the Tractate, with the exception just noted, to carry through rigorously at every point Professor Cooper's method of adaptation, and, finally, to condense it until it resembles the chapter on the epic. Professor Cooper's labors have brought us within a step of this result and have for the first time given us an outline of the technique of comedy which sounds like Aristotle. This is a tremendous achievement and should affect all future studies of the form and the function of comic drama.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

KENDALL K. SMITH

The Faliscans in Prehistoric Times. By Louise Adams Holland. Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, Volume V. American Academy in Rome (1925). Pp. xii + 162. Plates XIII.

The prehistoric peoples of Italy have gone, but their potsherds still talk and their language is becoming more intelligible. However broken it may be, it still tells of trade and commerce and migration and the interplay of cultural influences.

The subject of the bronze and iron ages in Italy is one to which may justly be applied the adjective 'intriguing', a stereotyped word with reviewers of modern novels. For obvious reasons most of the great names in this field have been Italian, but, since there is always a fascination about things distant in time or in space, it is not surprising that foreigners have been lured to it. Though they are no longer permitted to handle a spade on archaeological sites in Italy, they are still welcome to dig up facts.

In 1924 there appeared the first volume of *Italische Gräberkunde*, by Friedrich von Duhn¹, and also Villanovans and the Early Etruscans, by David Randall-MacIver². In the following year there were published two specialized studies, *Italic Hut Urns*

¹Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung.

²Oxford: at the Clarendon Press (see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 20.14-18).

¹Die Gliederung der Altattischen Komoedie (Leipzig, 1885).

and Hut Urn Cemeteries³, by W. R. Bryan, and *The Faliscans in Prehistoric Times*, by Louise Adams Holland. Mrs. Holland (née Louise E. W. Adams) is no tyro in this field. Her doctor's dissertation, *A Study in the Commerce of Latium from the Early Iron Age through the Sixth Century B. C.*⁴, is a careful and valuable piece of work.

Mrs. Holland is thoroughly familiar with the vast literature of her subject and is up to date; she is independent in her judgments and expresses her conclusions easily and clearly. The volume is a fine piece of research.

Mrs. Holland concludes (151-153) that in neolithic times the Faliscan territory was inhabited by a people whose culture did not, apparently, differ from that of other peoples in Italy; that no incursion of new people occurred in the Bronze Age; that late in the Iron Age there was established in this region a remnant of the cremating folk who overran Etruria and Latium and that they drove out or absorbed their less civilized predecessors; that after a generation or two a new people appeared who practised cremation, and were (152) "almost certainly of the same stock as those who appear at the same time and with the same custom in the Capenate region and in Latium..."; that inhuming and cremating branches of the population lived side by side; and that (153) "...As the rise of the Etruscan power brought about changes in the coastal towns, corresponding changes came to the Faliscans, who, though strongly affected by the Etruscans still maintained their individuality..." From this time they lived on as prosperous provincials until they succumbed to Rome.

The evidence presented seems to warrant these conclusions. I believe that they will be but little modified by future finds. The reader may be interested in comparing what von Duhn, 367-386, 457-458, has to say about the Ager Faliscus. His work appeared in time for Mrs. Holland to consult it. André Piganiol, *Essai sur les Origines de Rome* (53, 60-61, 310), believes that Faliscans uniting with the aborigines exercised some influence on the customs of early Rome⁵.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

EUGENE S. MCCARTNEY.

The Poems of Catullus. Done into English Verse by Hugh Macnaghten. Cambridge: at the University Press (1925). Pp. viii + 157.

To produce from a mind settled in the conviction that there is no such thing as a good translation an impartial review of any Latin work "done into English" is perhaps not easy; but in the present instance the task is facilitated by a counter conviction of almost equal age and vitality, to wit, that, if Catullus must be translated, the adventure would be safer in the hands of one Hugh Macnaghten than elsewhere. His little book, *The Story of Catullus* (London: Duckworth and Co., 1899), has been read with delight by successive

groups of my Freshman students, chiefly for its sympathetic and appealing appreciation of the poet, but also for the degree of success with which he has rendered into English verse thirty-seven of their favorite poems. Beyond doubt Mr. Macnaghten would agree with these College girls that his versions can do no more than approximate Catullus, and would rest content with their answer to the question "Who will read this book?", with which its Preface opens. Indeed, if he had been less modest in his estimate of his powers, it might not have taken a quarter of a century to reach a determination to gratify the wish expressed by Professor Tyrrell (in *The Pilot*, January 5, 1901, quoted in the Foreword to the present volume), that Mr. Macnaghten should give us "all the poems of Catullus in that English garb with which he seems to us exceptionally qualified to invest them". It was, he tells us (vii), "a kindly allusion to *The Story of Catullus* in... *The Times Literary Supplement* of October 30, 1924" which "changed the ineffectual desire to translate him into a resolve to make the attempt,...". The resulting volume contains all the known poems of Catullus except such as, the author evidently felt, had better be ignored. Critics will not be lacking, I dare say, to apply that unblest word 'Victorian' to his preference for such omissions, even in a book avowedly meant (148) to include "girls and boys" among its readers. That inclusion does not, certainly, imply all that it once did, but there may be readers even to-day and even among the younger generation who would be repelled by certain aspects of the discarded verses. I cannot, to be sure, defend his altering (viii) "in three cases, to preserve a poem... one objectionable word of the *original*". The italics are mine, and I must say that this seems a transgression of a translator's privilege. I would, too, that, when he felt it necessary to suppress a portion of any poem, he had indicated in some way that an omission had occurred. Yet, on the whole, I am glad that he did not feel morally bound to abide by all that Catullus's literary executor seems to have scraped up from among his papers and so religiously published, to the last syllable. As a matter of fact there is small literary loss and no considerable body of verse in the missing numbers, and, as the Latin text accompanies the English throughout the book, anyone who wishes may, by comparing it with a standard edition, determine for himself the extent of his deprivation.

The poems are left in their original order, and that is well. It is an order grotesquely unsatisfactory, to be sure, but no two persons are likely to agree on any attempt at rearrangement in chronological sequence. I never saw one I could accept, not even Mr. Macnaghten's, as indicated in his earlier book; each reader had best be left to turn the pages back and forth as his own fancy dictates.

It was inevitable that the author should wish to make some changes in the versions published twenty-five years before, and, *mirabile dictu*, they are with few exceptions undeniable betterments. They range in magnitude from a mere shift of word-order or the change of a single word ("kissings" for "kisses", in 7.1, for instance) to a complete rewriting of an epigram or

³Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, Volume IV (see *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 21.36-39).

⁴Reviewed in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 18.70-71.

⁵Volume 110 of *Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome* (1917).

the addition in 61 of nine stanzas not previously translated. Nearly all the alterations are in the direction of greater simplicity and closer adherence to the manner and thought-order of the original. It is precisely this adherence to the original pattern of thought and feeling, unaffectedly maintained in pleasing English verse, that constitutes Mr. Macnaghten's superiority as a translator of Catullus. Others may, at times, seem to surpass him in striking phrase that brings a sense of verve and sparkle, but presently one sees that this effect has been purchased at the cost of an increased remoteness from Catullus, and the price is too high. It is true that there are no good translations, *qua* translations, but there are better translations, and they are better in proportion as they remember that they are translations, not imitations or adaptations. I notice few attempts to reproduce in the English the meter of the Latin verse. Where such attempts do occur, they seem, *mea quidem sententia*, to involve a selfconscious painstaking which operates as a clog upon the happiness of the translation. In 63 especially, perhaps because the 'rushing Galliambics' are so alien to English speech, and alien, I venture to guess, to the author's own poet habits, this hampering is evident. Of this poem alone I find myself distinctly feeling, 'I have seen that done better'.

In other cases, without essaying the original meters, Mr. Macnaghten has achieved a considerable degree of success in approaching their effect. The lovely, lilting Glyconics of 34 and 61 are abandoned, but the stanza chosen is itself a swift and singing one. Thus the first stanza of 34,

Dianae sumus in fide
puellae et pueri integri:
Dianam pueri integri
puellaeque canamus.

becomes

Girls and boys in Dian's hand
Children innocent we stand:
Hymn we Dian, innocent
Boys and girls with one consent.

And Vinia comes to her bridegroom (61),

floridis velut enitens
myrtus Asia ramulis
quos Hamadryades deae
ludicrum sibi roscido
nutriunt umore,

or

Blossoming brightly now
As Asian myrtle bough,
Myrtle, the sweet plaything
Which from the dewy spring
Wood nymphs are watering.

Once the reviewer begins to quote, he is lost, but may we not grant space for 85, that short, fierce cry of anguish?

I hate and love. You question "How?" I lack
An answer, but I feel it on the rack.

I should like, myself, to put a dash after "feel it", but one must not tamper with another's punctuation.

¹Compare the version by Leigh Hunt, given in the "Broadway Translation" of Catullus, by F. A. Wright (London, George Routledge and Sons; New York, E. P. Dutton and Company. Undated). See pages 213-220.

Another feature to be commended consists of the notes (149-157). They are really helpful and enlightening, whether the reader is using the Latin text or the English.

The little book wears well on acquaintance. One may differ at times with its interpretation of Catullus, but he will do so with a comfortable feeling that the book cherishes no resentment. It is winning, too, in its physical aspect, modestly bound in brown and gold, of pocketable size, with good print and a fair page—Latin to the left, English to the right. There can be little doubt that Mr. Macnaghten has done something toward bringing his "starry lad" (148) within reach of readers who might else never have given Catullus himself the chance to "do the rest".

BARNARD COLLEGE

GRACE HARRIET GOODALE

Children of the Way. By Anne C. E. Allinson. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company (1923). Pp. 193.

Children of the Way, a second collection of stories of ancient Italy from the hand that gave us *Roads from Rome* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1913: see *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 7.72, 16.34), is a welcome addition to many bookshelves which cherish the earlier volume. The method of both is the same: a restrained and limpid English style, a scholarly and sympathetic grasp of the period in which the stories are set, and a sane, steady purpose, delicately and justly achieved.

Again we have the familiar authenticities of contemporary report and subsequent discovery wrought into a moving stream of life that restores their unity and affects us like fresh news from the elder days. No other writer of stories, in my experience, has utilized the established evidence, literary and monumental, to such effect of direct simplicity and convincing reality in depicting the folk of those days going about their daily processes of living. In the description of preparations for celebrating the Name Day of an artisan's baby son we read (*Children of the Way*, 6):

The stone floor had been washed. The table in front of the hearth, where the family always ate, had been spread with a clean white cloth taken from the old chest which was opened only on feast days. The silver salt-cellar that had belonged to her grandfather, for whom the baby was to be named, had been polished until Agatha could see the end of her little nose in it and placed in the middle of the table, while around it were set pitchers of wine mixed with water and plates of honey cake. . . .

Here the one bit of ancestral silver is true to its Horatian function as an index of self-respecting and frugally comfortable independence, but we see it in this rôle as the guests at the naming party saw it, casually and incidentally along with the other aspects of the household.

In the case of Mrs. Allinson's work the teacher is exempted from the painful necessity—all too prevalent in connection with the after-effects of 'historical' fiction—of removing from the minds of pupils sundry conceptions of ancient life startlingly at variance with

known facts. Mrs. Allinson has not found it necessary to defy those facts in order to tell her tales. Rather they are the very substance of her tales, and her utilization of sources recognizable even by Freshmen and Sophomores creates an irresistible impression that most of her details of local setting, of use and wont, are derived from sources as authentic. This impression is so near the truth that it may safely and beneficently be left undisturbed, for, where the sources leave an inescapable gap, and imagination must furnish material as well as structure, nothing out of keeping with the ancient substance is introduced, and the total effect is essentially veracious.

All I have said thus far applies in general to Roads from Rome as well as to Children of the Way. Yet, with all their correspondencies, the books are markedly different. In the first book we touch chiefly the life of men of letters, in the late Republic and early Empire, men either themselves belonging to the gentry or identified in their literary activity with the upper classes. In the second book we move among the humble of the land, stone-cutters, carpenters, farmers, bakers, and the like, in the reign of Nero, ere yet martyrdom had become so prominent a station upon the 'Way' of early Christianity, and while Christianity was still an experience rather than a theology. Folk of this sort are not featured in the literature of that day, not, at least, as individuals, and it is to the inscriptions that Mrs. Allinson betakes herself for the story of their lives, while still using freely the 'local color' furnished by poet and historian.

An interesting forerunner of this book is her essay, *Faces in the Roman Crowd*, in *The Yale Review*, New Series, 5.146-165 (October, 1915). Read in connection with the Preface of Roads from Rome this essay shows her conviction that the declared "main purpose" of that volume (vii), "to show that the men and women of ancient Rome were like ourselves", is but imperfectly accomplished even when the secondary purpose (vii), "to suggest Roman conditions as they may have affected or appeared to men of letters in successive epochs...", is achieved. I must not use the space to copy here the paragraphs through which she leads to that conviction, but it is finally recorded thus (*The Yale Review* 5.153-154):

...Rome's message, therefore, of abundant and persistent life, a message which creates new faith as often as we are made doubtful by public or private disaster, will be incomplete until we see in her streets and public places, not a rabble which has no existence except when it cheers or curses in unison, but men and women who have come from and who must go back to their own very human experiences in workshop or home.

These men and women, and with them their children, discovered in "a collection of metrical epitaphs sorted out from the inscriptions", are the "friends"² of whom Mrs. Allinson writes in *Children of the Way*, drawing the group together around the central theme of early Christian experiences. The same characters often appear in several of the nine stories in the book, and

the Christian message reaches most of them, directly or in roundabout fashion, "from an extraordinary government prisoner, named Paul, who preached every day to groups of visitors...". A soldier of the praetorian guard who had this prisoner in charge spoke of him and his teachings to a brother-in-law, a carpenter, and the carpenter in turn passes on the good tidings to the stone-cutter from whom he is ordering a tombstone for his little daughter, lately dead. He gives directions to omit the pagan "D. M.", and to begin with the child saying¹ 'I lived eight years, seven months and five days... I was intelligent beyond my years, lovely to look at, nicely behaved, and had sweet, caressing ways which called out love'. Below these words he wishes to add, "Vives in Deo", and the stone-cutter, whose own blithe little tom-boy Agatha had but recently been killed in a street accident, is startled into eager question.

In the second story a man from the country who had come to Rome to better himself and succeeded only in worsening to the point of drunkenness, starvation, and well-nigh suicide is befriended by the stone-cutter and introduced to a group of followers of the Way who meet once a week "to talk about Jesus Christ". In the third, a young lad, eldest of a large family in a slum tenement, burdened beyond his years and developing a bitter resentment toward life, finds spiritual rescue among these same friends. He, in turn, is instrumental in bringing to the home of his rather unscrupulous master a member of the Christian circle who apparently has the power to heal—at least the rich man's son who seemed like to die of a fever grows cool and sleeps after Festus brings his quiet presence to the sick room. This is perhaps the least successful of the stories, least sure in touch and a trifle vague in effect, but one would not, for all that, have it omitted from the group. Then comes a young soldier, a lad from a village in the Sabine hills, who has found the Way among his comrades and cannot give it up even though it brings grief and anxiety to his father and mother as he leaves them for service at the front, unprotected by the gods to whom they have been wont to pray.

Yet, with all this throng of simple folk, it is to a more sophisticated spirit, a more practised mind, that Mrs. Allinson leaves the last word. The lady Honoria was "well-born, of the equestrian rank, and even distantly affiliated with the higher aristocrats of the senatorial order..."³ She "belonged to the emancipated women of Rome. She had even studied philosophy seriously, and she had also fitted herself to practise law. Although she could not appear in public as an advocate, she was able privately to transact considerable legal business..."⁴ This wise and prudent lady observes a striking change for the better in the household of a rather feather-brained younger sister, a change brought about by contact with Christianity in its most simple and childlike aspect, present there in the person of a young girl slave. Not being able to make much out of what this girl and her mistress, almost equally naive

¹The Yale Review, 5.155.

²Children of the Way, Epilogue, 193.

³Ibidem, 29.

⁴Ibidem, 26.

⁵Ibidem, 133.

⁶Ibidem, 133.

and unreasoning, can tell about the new religion, Honoria with characteristic intellectual curiosity arranges an interview with Paul himself, recognizes in him at once a scholar and a thinker, and pitches the key of the conversation to that note. Of the interview Paul says afterward (165), "...she held out the wrong cup to be filled. She brought me her intellect, and to that Jesus crucified is but a stumbling block and foolishness".

Honoria's more detailed report, in a letter to her brother in Egypt, is not so easily summarized. She had talked with Paul of the various philosophies and cults, but she soon felt that Paul had accepted her terms simply as a temporary expedient for reaching her mind (180) "with a ray of the new light which, like some undreamed of primal element, has created for him—the words are his own—a new earth and a new heaven". Still, after leaving him, she gropingly tries to fit this thing into her known categories, but is too sound and honest a thinker to believe she has done so, even when she finds in Christian teachings "much that is old and familiar", monotheism, Eternal Purpose behind phenomena, the immortality of the soul—"when hasn't somebody believed in it! I confess I don't, but Plato seems to have convinced himself of the proposition!", she cries (187)—, and so on. But the best she can do with it in the end is to record an extraordinary impression, an impression of *life* (189): "...Every Christian I have met seems to me to be amazingly alive..." Yet for all her frank tribute to Christianity and her deep gratitude for its gift of happiness to her sister, she assures her brother that she is not going to tell him she has become a Christian, nor will she ever go to Christian meetings, or back to Paul. She sends the affectionate family greetings and tells him (191) that his little niece wants him to "come home soon, and bring her an ivory doll, and a baby crocodile—please".

Mrs. Allinson has no formal Preface in this book, but a quotation from Carlyle which stands where a preface might stand justifies the assumption that, besides the completion of the "main purpose" announced for *Roads from Rome*, there is here the secondary purpose of showing how Christianity arose and spread abroad among men, not "by institutions and establishments and well arranged systems of mechanism", but "by simple altogether natural and individual efforts". Both these assumed purposes, at any rate, become results in *Children of the Way*.

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GRACE HARRIET GOODALE

Reddenda Minima. By T. K. E. Batterbury. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch (1926). Pp. 100.

Mr. Batterbury's book, *Reddenda Minima*, bears the subtitle, *A Latin Translation Book for Beginners*. The little volume is the work of an English author. Since it consists for the most part of disconnected sentences, it will probably not find much favor in this country; the present trend here is toward connected discourse even in first-year Latin.

Part I consists of thirty-two sections containing in all 500 short sentences. In each section a heading shows the construction or the constructions illustrated. Part II consists of 150 miscellaneous sentences which are slightly more difficult than those in Part I. In general, the sentences in both parts are well-chosen. Following these two divisions of the book is a vocabulary covering about thirty-four pages, and containing some irregular verb-forms, in addition to the usual vocabulary-forms.

Part III is a six-page discussion entitled *Hints on Translation*. While some of the suggestions given here are good, there is in the methods suggested nothing particularly novel and much that is very artificial. Especially the scheme for underlining groups of words, bracketing clauses, and drawing lines back from relatives to their antecedents (85) strikes this reviewer as cumbersome and of little value. A young pupil would not be able to handle such tools effectively; an older pupil would not need them. The best section of Part III is the last (87), where some good, but not new, miscellaneous hints on translation are given.

Part IV consists of twenty-five short passages of connected Latin for translation; each passage is followed by the necessary vocabulary. Here we find such stories as *The Jackdaw of Rheims*, and *Pyramus and Thisbe*, besides *Titus Manlius* (Eutropius), *Sour Grapes* (Phaedrus), *Winter* (Horace), *The Age of Gold* (Ovid), and *The Way to the Lower World* (Vergil). Here, too, are several extracts from Caesar's *Commentaries* and one from Cicero's *First Catilinarian Oration*. Some of these passages are not well-chosen—a fact which even the author seems to recognize, so that he has deemed it necessary to supply long vocabularies.

In a word, then, to this reviewer this book seems negligible, at least for this country. Part I and Part II might be of use for rapid review drill in a second-year or a third-year Latin class, but, even for such classes there are other books that will serve the purpose better.

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